The App You Need, and the App You Skip

India’s online travel market is often spoken of as one business. The numbers say otherwise. In the year to March 2026, the country’s largest online travel platform sold about 141.5 million bus tickets, roughly 33% more than a year earlier, but only 59.1 million flight segments, a gain of less than one percent. Both are booked on the same phones, paid for through the same digital payment rails and sold by the same kind of app. Yet one is racing ahead while the other has nearly stopped.

Economists would call this a divergence, a loose cousin of the K-shaped recoveries seen after Covid, where one part of the economy climbs while another stalls. The explanation is not technology or payments, which are identical for both. It lies in the structure of the markets behind them: how many sellers there are, how much of the journey has already moved online, and what roads and runways can carry.

This article examines that gap through five lenses, each backed by data, and asks a simple question: why are aggregators indispensable for buses but only optional for flights?

  1. Two businesses, two directions: the numbers that started this
  2. Thousands of sellers versus two giants
  3. The runway: why bus is at 19% online and air at 75%
  4. Roads moved faster than runways
  5. The price of being needed, and why the lead is not permanent

    1. Two businesses, two directions

Start with the scoreboard. In the year to March 2026 (FY26), India’s largest online travel company sold about 141.5 million bus tickets, up from 106.5 million a year earlier and 86.8 million in FY24. That is 32.9% growth in the latest year alone.

Flights tell a quieter story. Flight segments, which count each leg so that a round trip is two, went from 51.1 million in FY24 to 58.7 million in FY25, then crept to 59.1 million in FY26: growth of just 0.7%. Domestic segments actually slipped, from 46.8 million to 45.9 million, and international travel supplied the small gain. Over two years, bus tickets rose about 63% and flight segments about 15.5%, almost all of it in FY25.

Is this one company’s quirk? The wider market says no. DGCA data show domestic airlines carried 110.53 million passengers from January to August 2026, 0.18% below the same period last year, and August alone fell 6.34%, to 12.13 million from 12.95 million. Supply is the culprit: aviation data firm OAG reports that domestic seat capacity fell 5.6% in September.

One fairness note. Flights are stalled, not collapsing, and the money earned from them still grew. More on that in section five.

2. Thousands of sellers versus two giants

Look at the bus market from the traveller’s seat. India has roughly 4,500 private bus operators and more than 25 state transport corporations, together running about 100,000 services a day (industry data, FY23). An older study found that most private operators run fewer than 20 buses each. Every service differs in departure time, seat type, boarding point and reliability. Without one place to compare them, you would be calling agents or walking to counters. That mess is the raw material of an aggregator.

Now the sky. In August 2026, IndiGo carried about 65% of domestic passengers and Air India Group 26.7%. Two groups, roughly 92% of the market (that sum is our arithmetic). On most routes you choose among two or three airlines at similar fares, and each has a polished app of its own. There is little left to compare.

Think of a mandi with 4,500 stalls versus a town with two supermarkets. At the mandi, you need a guide. At the supermarkets, you just walk in.

Three theories make the point. Ben Thompson’s Aggregation Theory (2015) says aggregators win when they own the customer relationship and suppliers are scattered and interchangeable. In bus, the traveller’s relationship is with the app. In air, it belongs to the airline. Michael Porter’s five forces say concentrated suppliers hold bargaining power over middlemen: a giant airline has it, a 15-bus operator does not. And George Stigler’s work on search costs (1961) says comparison creates value only where there is a lot to search through.

3. The runway: why bus is at 19% online and air at 75%

Bus has something air has already used up: room to grow. Industry estimates for FY23 put the share of bookings made online at about 82% for rail, 74-76% for air, 31-33% for hotels and just 19% for bus, worth roughly ₹100 billion. So in bus, four out of five tickets were still bought at counters and from local agents. Each one is a customer waiting to move online.

That is the S-curve of adoption: a slow start, a steep middle, a flat top. Air is near the flat top, so its growth now depends on more flyers, and seats are scarce. Bus is in the steep middle. One caution: online bus bookings grew 2.5 times between FY22 and FY23, but FY22 was a Covid year, so part of that jump is recovery from a low base. Bus was projected to reach 26% online by FY26, but that was a forecast, and the actual figure is not available in the sources we reviewed.

Once bookings move online, the leader tends to win big. A bus platform serves two groups: riders want more operators, and operators want more riders, so each side pulls in the other. This is a two-sided network effect. The pioneer platform, founded in 2006, first had to solve the cold-start problem, persuading operators to share seat inventory online while riders still distrusted online payments. Having solved it, the largest platform held about three-quarters of the intermediary bus market in FY23. Since intermediaries made up 88% of online bus bookings, that works out to about 66% of all online bus tickets (our calculation).

None of this means air aggregators are absent. Intermediaries still handled 80-82% of online air bookings in FY23. ‘Optional’ describes need, not market share: many flyers still use them out of habit, for coupons, or for one-stop search.

4. Roads moved faster than runways

The third force is physical. National highways grew from 91,287 km in 2014 to 146,572 km by March 2026, up 61%. Access-controlled expressways and high-speed corridors rose from 93 km to 3,052 km, and the government says construction pace climbed from 11.6 km a day to about 34 km a day.

A caution on that last figure. The network grew by roughly 55,300 km over twelve years, an average of about 12.6 km a day. The gap likely exists because construction counts the widening of existing roads, and some growth may come from reclassifying roads as national highways. Treat ‘km per day’ as effort, not new road.

Now airports: from 74 in 2014 to 165 in July 2026, up 123%, faster in percentage terms than highways. Yet traffic has not followed. Under the regional UDAN scheme, 95 airports, heliports and water aerodromes are connected through 679 routes, which have carried about 16.8 million passengers since 2017. Compare that with the 110.5 million domestic passengers flown in just eight months of 2026. An airport is a doorway. Without aircraft, nobody walks through it.

Roads have no such bottleneck. Any operator can add a bus, which is far cheaper and faster than adding an aircraft. Better roads also shorten journeys, so on routes of a few hundred kilometres a bus competes better with a flight whose total time includes airport transit and security. Economists call this the generalised cost of travel: time, money and hassle together. And new roads open new city pairs with new operators, which means even more scattered sellers, which means more work for an aggregator. It is a loop.

The caveat: highways help cars as well, and we found no study tying highway length directly to bus tickets sold. It is a plausible driver, not a proven one.

5. The price of being needed, and why the lead is not permanent

Being needed pays, at least in percentages. In FY26 the largest platform kept about 10.2% of bus booking value as margin (commissions and fees, net of customer discounts) against 7.0% for air. Take rate is roughly the price of bargaining power: small operators pay more, large airlines pay less.

But percentages hide rupees. A bus ticket is cheap. By our calculation from reported figures, that is about ₹111 of margin per bus ticket against about ₹660 per flight segment (dollar figures converted at about ₹96 to the US dollar). It is why air margin, at about ₹3,910 crore, is still about 2.5 times bus margin of about ₹1,570 crore. Bus makes its money through volume. Air’s margin rose 13.4% even though volume rose only 0.7%, thanks to higher fares, a better take rate (6.4% to 7.0%) and international bookings. Bus margin rose 29.3% on a 32.9% rise in tickets.

Now the catch. Bus growth is partly bought: customer discounts rose to about ₹180 crore from about ₹110 crore, and the take rate slipped from 10.5% to 10.2%. Many buyers are first-timers who will not stay first-timers forever. Operators could build their own channels, and the 12% of online bus bookings that already go direct is a start. In air, one forecast has the share handled by travel agents falling from 66% in FY20 to 60% by FY27, which means the direct channel is rising.

So the sharper claim isn’t that aggregators are losing in air. It is that they are indispensable in bus and optional in air. Optional can last a long time, but it is a weaker position to hold.

What’s in it for you

For readers who allocate capital, the takeaway is a way of reading a sector, not a call on any one company. Value tends to settle wherever the scarce thing sits: aircraft and seats in air, and the platform that organises thousands of scattered operators in bus.

The two models, side by side (FY26 unless stated; dollar figures converted at about ₹96 to the US dollar)

Three lessons sit inside that table. First, percentages and rupees tell different stories. Bus earns a higher cut, but only about ₹111 a ticket, so it works only at scale. Air’s margin pool is about 2.5 times larger. Second, fast growth from a low base is not the same as durable growth. Bus has room left, but part of its growth is bought: customer discounts rose about 60%, from about ₹110 crore to about ₹180 crore, against bus bookings up 28.2% (our calculation), and the margin rate slipped from 10.5% to 10.2%. Third, owning the scarce asset carries its own risk. Air’s volumes are capped by aircraft supply, with domestic seats down 5.6% in September.

One seasonal footnote. Diwali falls on November 8, seats are scarce, and fares on thin regional routes have risen more than threefold. For anyone paying for certainty rather than the lowest fare, booking early matters more than comparing prices.

This is a framework for reading the sector, not a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Disclamer- This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment, legal, or tax advice. Please consult qualified professionals before making any financial decisions. MintWit Financial Services LLP is an AMFI-registered Mutual Fund Distributor (ARN-283168); however, all investments are subject to market risks and returns are not assured.